Energy Information Administration
strategic location makes it a natural "energy bridge" between major
oil producing areas in the Middle East and Caspian Sea regions on the one hand,
and consumer markets in Europe on the other. Turkey's port of Ceyhan is an important
outlet both for current Iraqi oil exports as well as for potential future Caspian
oil exports. Turkey's Bosporus Straits are a major shipping "choke point"
between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Finally, Turkey is a rapidly growing
energy consumer in its own right.
Note: Information contained in this report is the best available as of August 2000 and can change.
After a sharp decline of 5.3% in Turkey's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during 1999, the country's economy is expected to rebound in 2000 to growth of 3.6%-4.0%. Turkey's economy grew at a 7%-8% annual rate between 1995 and 1997, with annual wholesale inflation of 82%-89%. In 2000, inflation is expected to slow sharply, to around 25-27%, partly as a result of dramatic improvements in the country's public finances, income from privatization, a recovery in industrial production from the economic crisis of 1999, and reconstruction following the major earthquake of August 1999.
Turkey faces numerous economic challenges, including: a large "underground" economy (estimated at 30%-100% of the reported economy); sharp income inequalities (between urban and rural areas in particular); low levels of private investment (Turkey hopes to increase this dramatically); a large, inefficient state sector; and a failure to generate sufficient jobs for the country's rapidly growing population.
In December 1999, Turkey's 3-party coalition government (headed by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who won elections in April 1999) signed an agreement with the IMF under which Turkey will receive $4 billion in IMF funds, and in turn pledges to undertake major structural reforms over the next 3 years (Turkey also received a $760 million World Bank loan in May 2000). Turkey's major goals under this agreement are: 1) to raise its annual gross national product (GNP) growth rate to 5.8% in 2002 (compared to a decline of 6.4% in 1999); 2) to reduce inflation to around 5% by the end of 2002 from around 50% this year; 3) to achieve a fiscal surplus of 3.7% of GNP in 2002 compared to a deficit of 2.7% in 1999; 3) to achieve lower interest rates through monetary and exchange rate policies, along with a shift to a more flexible exchange, "crawling peg" regime (including fixed monthly targets for depreciation of the lira, with a goal of a 20% depreciation in 2000); 4) to carry out structural reforms aimed at strengthening public finances, reducing inequalities in the tax code, and decreasing wasteful public spending; and 5) to privatize key sectors, including energy and telecommunications (so far in 2000, Turkey has privatized 51% of formerly state-owned petroleum distributor Petrol Ofisi (POAS), as well as 31.5% of state oil refinery Tupras, for a total of $2.3 billion).
In July 1999, Turkey's government agreed to a controversial amendment to article 47 of the constitution, which regulates nationalization. The amendment would prohibit private entities from being taken over by the government. In August 1999, another amendment was agreed to which would change the classification of power projects from "public concessions" to "commercial agreements." In January 2000, Bill No. 4501 was passed, approving these changes. This could help pave the way for multi-billion dollar energy investments in Turkey. Turkey hopes to raise $7.6 billion from privatization in 2000, and $6.1 billion in 2001.
Turkish oil consumption has increased in recent years, and this trend is expected to continue, with growth of 2%-3% annually in coming years. Oil provides nearly half of Turkey's total energy requirements, but its share is declining (as the share of natural gas rises). Around 90% of Turkey's oil supplies are imported, mainly from the Middle East and Russia. Turkish imports from Saudi Arabia have declined in recent years as Iraqi oil supplies have gradually increased. Turkey's port of Ceyhan is a major outlet for Iraqi oil exports.
Turkey's oil production is accounted for primarily by three companies -- the Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO), and foreign operators Royal Dutch/Shell (Shell) and ExxonMobil. TPAO alone accounts for nearly 80% of the country's oil output (currently running around 69,000 bbl/d, down from 90,000 bbl/d in 1991). Oil fields in the country's southeast (specifically the Hakkari Basin, Turkey's main oil producing area) are generally small, old, and expensive to exploit. In addition to the Hakkari Basin, Turkey contains oil prospects in the Aegean Sea, and in other oil basins in the south and southeast.
In September 1994, TPAO became part of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), a consortium of foreign oil companies in a multi-billion dollar oil production-sharing agreement with Azeri state oil company Socar to develop three offshore oil fields in the Caspian Sea region. TPAO holds a 6.75% share in AIOC. TPAO has established an oil exploration company in Kazakhstan (Kazakhturkmunay)as well, and also is active in other areas of the world, including the Middle East and North Africa.
For several years, it has been reported that as much as 70,000 bbl/d of fuel and fuel products were being smuggled into Turkey via tanker truck, mainly from northern Iraq. This "border trade" costs the Turkish treasury millions of dollars in lost tax revenue. In March 2000, Turkey's National Security Council (MGK), concerned at lost tax revenues as well as harm to state companies Poas and Tupras, imposed controls on petroleum product smuggling from Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, Iran, Georgia, the Azeri enclave of Nakhchevan, Syria, and Bulgaria. A previous crackdown on smuggling in May 1999 reportedly had little effect. As of July 2000, oil product smuggling into Turkey reportedly had been cut in half.
Oil and gas transportation is a crucial and contentious issue in the Caspian Sea/Central Asia regions. Turkey and the United States have been pressing for a "Western route" pipeline that would carry oil from Azerbaijan's port of Baku through Azerbaijan and Georgia and then across Turkey to Ceyhan, at an estimated cost of $1.8-$4 billion. This would be a major part of the proposed "Eurasian Corridor" to bring Caspian oil and gas to international markets via Turkey, and to bypass Russia and Iran. Russia, on the other hand, is promoting a "Northern route" across the Caucasus to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. From there oil, would be transported through the Bosporus or via a proposed pipeline from Bulgaria to Greece and the rest of Europe. Other proposals include a pipeline to Georgia's Black Sea port of Supsa, and a swap arrangement with, or export pipeline through, Iran.
In November 1999, at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia signed a legal framework intended to allow Baku-Ceyhan to begin. Also, in March 2000, Azerbaijan reportedly reached a compromise agreement with Georgia on transit fees. One advantage which Baku-Ceyhan has over other potential options for Caspian oil transport is that Ceyhan can handle Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), while the ports of Supsa (Georgia) and Novorossiysk (Russia) are restricted to smaller LR-2 tankers which can transit the Bosporus. Another advantage for Ceyhan is that it can remain all year, compared to Novorossiysk, which is closed up to 2 months per year due to bad weather.
The cost of the Baku-Ceyhan route has been a major issue. Despite Turkey's assertions that Baku-Ceyhan would be economically viable, members of the AIOC have delayed choosing a route. A key question is the volume of oil available for the pipeline; as of 1999, AIOC's production was 115,000 bbl/d, compared to the 1 million bbl/d which some analysts have cited as needed to make the pipeline economical. AIOC has stated that the planned Phase-1 program to develop the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli block, which will increase production to 400,000 bbl/d, will not begin until mid-2004-2005. In effect, full-scale development of the AIOC project will be delayed until a decision has been made on export options, including whether this oil will be exported via the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.
Refining and other downstream operations in Turkey are dominated by partly-state-owned company Tupras, which has four main refining complexes: Batman in the southeast, Aliaga near Izmir, Izmit near Istanbul (the country's largest refinery), and the Central Anatolian Refinery at Kirikkale near Ankara. In 1998, Tupras' market share of the Turkish refining sector was around 85%. Tupras has a modernization program designed to switch output at its refineries towards lighter products. Turkey's sole private refinery is Atas, near Mersin on the Mediterranean coast, a joint venture of Mobil (51%), Shell (27%), BP Amoco (17%), and local company Marmara Petrol ve Rafineri Isleri AS (5%).
Current gas production (20 billion cubic feet -- Bcf -- from 14 gas fields) in Turkey meets around 5% of domestic gas consumption requirements. Major gas producers in Turkey include Arco, TPAO and Shell. Marmara Kuzey (North Marmara), which came onstream in May 1997, is the country's largest non-associated gas field. Marmara Kuzey is located offshore in the Thrace-Gallipoli Basin of the Sea of Marmara. Most Turkish associated gas is reinjected into oilfields as part of an Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) system.
Turkish natural gas demand is projected to increase rapidly in coming years, with the prime consumers expected to be power plants and industrial users. Turkey consumed 370 Bcf of natural gas in 1998, accounting for around 13% of Turkey's total energy consumption, and nearly all imported. Many analysts are skeptical of Turkey's rapid gas demand growth forecasts, in part over Turkey's financial ability to construct gas-fired power plants, as well as new pipelines and/or liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities, quickly enough. Meanwhile, Turkey is pressing ahead with plans to liberalize the country's gas sector.
Natural gas is Turkey's preferred fuel for new power plant capacity to be added in coming years. This makes sense for Turkey for several reasons: environmental (gas is cleaner than coal, lignite, or oil); geographic (Turkey is close to huge amounts of gas in the Middle East and Central Asia); energy security (Turkey is seeking to diversify its energy import sources); economic (Turkey could offset part of its energy import bill through transit fees it could charge for oil and gas shipments across its territory); and political (Turkey is seeking to strengthen relations with Caspian and Central Asian countries, several of which are potentially large gas exporters).
The bulk of Turkish gas demand currently is met by imports, around 70% coming from Russia via the trans-Balkan pipeline, and the other 30% mainly from Algeria and Nigeria via LNG tankers. Turkey would like to diversify its gas import sources, and has signed deals with a variety of countries, including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Turkmenistan.
On December 15, 1997, Russia and Turkey signed a 25-year deal under which the Russian gas company, Gazprom, would construct a new gas export pipeline to Turkey for delivery of more than 500 Bcf of natural gas annually, with initial deliveries possibly starting in 2002. The $2.7-billion, 758-mile "Blue Stream" dual pipeline would run from Izobilnoye in southern Russia, to Dzhugba on the Black Sea, then under the Black Sea for about 247 miles to the Turkish port of Samsun, and on to Ankara. When completed, possibly by 2002/2003 or earlier (Gazprom has stated that deliveries could begin in 2001), the Blue Stream lines will be the world's deepest underwater gas pipelines, and will require complex engineering to construct the pipeline (including a corrosive environment due to high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide at the bottom of the Black Sea). Some analysts continue to believe the Blue Stream will not be built because it is too expensive and technically difficult, although in March 2000, the two main companies involved in Blue Stream -- Russia's Gazprom and Italy's ENI SpA -- announced that they had arranged $1.6 billion in financing for the project. Eventually, the Blue Stream project could be extended onwards to other Mediterranean countries, such as Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. (Turkey and Greece also reportedly have discussed linking their gas grids). As of mid-2000, Turkey and Russia had begun construction on above-ground sections of the pipeline. In June 2000, Turkey's parliament ratified an annex protocol to the Blue Stream agreement, granting tax exemptions to investors in the project. Turkey's overland section of Blue Stream is expected to cost $339 million.
A controversial plan to supply Turkey with gas is a swap deal between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, signed in 1996. Under this arrangement, Turkmenistan would export gas to Iran, which would then pump its own gas to Turkey. In January 2000, Turkey and Iran announced agreement on postponing the gas deal's start to July 2001, more than a year behind schedule, due to lack of completion of two pipeline stages in Turkey (Iran announced in December 1999 that its portion of the project was ready). The 46-inch 160-mile (260-km) line runs from Dogubeyazit, on the Iranian border, to Erzurum, Turkey. From Erzurum, the pipeline is to extend to Sivas, and then on to Ankara. Iranian gas used to supply the pipeline will come from the non-associated Kangan fields as well as from associated sources around Ahwaz. In late July 1999, the Turkish Treasury signed a $131-million loan with Japan's Marubeni Corp. and Germany's WestLB to finance part of a gas pipeline in eastern Turkey (from Erzurum to Imranli) to transport either Turkmen or Iranian gas.
Turkey's gas deal with Iran has brought criticism from the United States for political reasons. However, because Iran will only receive transit fees for moving the gas to Turkey, the United States determined that Turkey was not in violation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which imposes sanctions on companies investing more than $20 million in Iran's oil and gas industries. Meanwhile, Turkey has steadfastly maintained that it needs to diversify its suppliers of natural gas away from Russia and that Turkmen and Iranian gas represent economically sound alternatives.
On May 21, 1999, Botas (Turkey's state gas generation and transmission company) and Turkmenistan signed an agreement on building a $2-$2.4 billion, 1,050-mile, gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, underneath the Caspian Sea, across Azerbaijan and Georgia (both of which would collect transit fees), and on to Turkey. Gas deliveries of 565-1,060 Bcf per year could begin by 2002 or 2003, with additional gas possibly being sent onwards to Europe. The consortium is led by U.S. company Bechtel and including General Electric, Shell, and PSG International. In mid-July 1999, a top Turkish energy official stated that the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) from Turkmenistan was still the preferred option for Turkey despite a large (as high as 35 trillion cubic feet -- Tcf) recent natural gas find in Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field, which is located hundreds of miles closer to Turkey than Turkmenistan (Shah Deniz could be expensive to develop, but also could be linked into the TCP system; Azerbaijan has demanded half the TCP's capacity for Shah Deniz gas, while Turkmenistan has offered only one-sixth). Turkish government officials previously have stated that a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan is a top priority, although it would compete against the proposed Blue Stream project, as well as against possible gas supplies from Egypt, Iran, and now Azerbaijan (gas deliveries from Shah Deniz -- 51% controlled by BP Amoco and Statoil -- could begin as soon as 2002/2003, according to BP Amoco). Turkey claims that its gas demand growth will be fast enough to support multiple pipelines, but many analysts believe Turkey's forecasts are unrealistic, and that only one of the main options (i.e., Blue Stream, TCP, Shah Deniz) -- can be supported for some time. Meanwhile, progress on the TCP appears stalled at the moment, with the international consortium essentially having suspended operations for now, while Blue Stream appears to be proceeding. On July 31, 2000, Shell said that time was running out for Turkmenistan if it wanted to proceed with the TCP, and that the more convenient gas supplies of Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan could supplant Turkmen gas. Turkmen President Niyazov has insisted on upfront payment of hundreds of millions of dollars from the international consortium, and recently has discussed the possibility of exporting more of its gas to Russia.
Egypt is another possible source of gas for Turkey, either via an offshore pipeline which also would deliver gas to the Gaza Strip, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, or via LNG tankers, possibly beginning in 2004. This project would include construction of a $1.2-billion liquefaction terminal near Port Said on the Mediterranean coast, and a regasification facility at Izmir in Turkey. Egypt and Turkey signed a preliminary agreement for LNG exports in 1996, but analysts have raised serious questions about whether the project is economically feasible. In February 2000, the vice-chairman for natural gas at the Egyptian General Petroleum Company, Mahmoud Latif Amer, said that gas exports to Turkey would begin in 2004, but that a decision between pipeline and LNG options had not been made (given sufficient future demand, both export routes to Turkey theoretically could go forward). New LNG terminals in Turkey are being planned, including one adjacent to the existing Ereglisi combined cycle gas turbine power station (which began operations in June 1999), a regasification terminal at Aliaga (near Izmir on the Aegean Sea), an LNG terminal at Iskenderun on the Mediterranean, and even the world's first floating LNG terminal (Botas reportedly has issued a tender for such a plant to be located at Izmit Bay, near Istanbul, for the next two winters).
With a young and growing population, low per capita electricity consumption, rapid urbanization and strong economic growth, Turkey for nearly two decades has been one of the fastest growing power markets in the world. Projections by Turkey's Electricity Generating and Transmission Corporation (TEAS), a public company which owns and operates 15 thermal and 30 hydroelectric plants generating 91% of Turkey's electricity, indicate that rapid (as high as 10% annual) growth in electricity consumption will continue over the next 15 years. With electricity shortages and blackouts already common (partly as a result of generation and distribution losses as high as 20%), increasing the country's electricity generating capacity therefore is a top priority for Turkish energy officials. If Turkish forecasts prove correct (and some analysts believe that they are too high), Turkey may need to triple its total electric power generating capacity by 2015. According to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR), this would also require investments of $4-$4.5 billion per year, much of which would need to come from the private sector.
A major dilemma now faced by Turkey is how to invest in new electric power capacity while at the same time adhering to foreign debt ceilings mandated under lending rules set by the IMF. Conventional financing of major infrastructure projects would only increase the amount of foreign credit, thus MENR has conceived other options for financing projects. One option is the so-called Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) model, under which private investors build and operate private sector generation facilities for a set number of years, at which point they transfer ownership to the state. First introduced in 1984 by then Prime Minister Turgat Ozal, BOT projects have been plagued by legal problems, which has slowed their implementation. Several BOT plants currently are under construction, including gas-fired units at Marmara Ereglisi and Istanbul, and a $1.6-billion, 672-MW hydro project at Birecik on the Euphrates River (due for completion in 2001). In coming years, many more power plant projects could be offered to the private sector under the BOT (or possibly an alternative Build-Operate, or BO model), particularly given recent changes in Turkish law which reclassifies power projects as "commercial agreements."
Turkey has extensive plans to increase natural gas use for electric power production. Germany's Siemens AG is leading a consortium of companies in building a $1.45-billion, 1,300-MW, coal-fired power plant near Iskenderun, in southern Turkey. The plant is scheduled for completion in 2003 and is to burn imported coal. In other news, GE Power Systems is supplying natural gas-fired turbine generators worth more than $900 million for three new combined cycle power plants (the 770-MW Adapazari, 1,540-MW Gebze, and 1,520-MW Izmir plants). Combined, the three plants are expected to have nearly 4 GW of power generating capacity when they are completed in 2002/2003. GE also reportedly is supplying power generation equipment and services for construction of a $194-million, 206 MW, gas-fired, BOT power plant for Alapi. This plant is scheduled to enter commercial service in late 2002. Several pipeline projects have been proposed to supply gas to these facilities, as well as several LNG terminals. In addition, Botas is expanding its gas transmission network along the Black Sea and the Aegean.
In addition to increasing domestically generated electricity through construction of new power plants, Turkey is looking outside its borders to help meet the country's rapidly growing power demand. In May 1999, for instance, Turkish and Turkmen officials reached agreement on power supplies from Turkmenistan. Turkey already is importing 4 billion kilowatt-hours (bkwh) from Bulgaria, and has signed a memorandum with other Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) members to look into creation of a regional power grid. Turkey also imports power from Georgia and Iran. Finally, increased natural gas imports will be used largely for electricity generation, with new LNG terminals to be attached to Independent Power Producer (IPP) gas-fired generation facilities.
Turkey has significant hydroelectric power resources (104 total plants, installed capacity of 10.2 GW), and is developing a great deal more, especially as part of the $32-billion Southeast Anatolia -- GAP -- hydropower and irrigation project. When completed, GAP, which is considered one of the most ambitious water development projects ever undertaken, will include 21 dams, 19 hydro plants (with around 7.5 GW of power generating capacity), and a network of tunnels and irrigation canals. Major Turkish hydro dams include: Ataturk (2,400 MW); Karakaya (1,800 MW capacity); Ilisu (1,200 MW; the largest hydro project on the Tigris River); Cizre (240 MW); Silvan/Kayser (240 MW); Batman (198 MW); and Karkamis (180 MW).
In July 2000, the Turkish government decided to abandon a planned, but oft-delayed, $4-billion, 1,300-MW nuclear power plant. Three international consortia (AECL of Canada, Westinghouse-Mitsubishi of the United States and Japan, and NPI of France and Germany) had submitted bids to build the plant, which would have been Turkey's first nuclear plant. The project was to have been turnkey and would have been located at Akkuyu, on the southern Mediterranean coast. Reportedly, the plant was killed for financial reasons, although there also had been opposition from environmental and anti-nuclear groups, as well as neighboring countries like Greece. Prime Minister Ecevit said that Turkey was not abandoning nuclear power completely, and would consider building the plant in 10-20 years, particularly if nuclear technology improves.
Turkey's explosive growth in the mid-90's was not without repercussions for its environment. Economic growth and energy consumption have gone hand-in-hand, and the effect has been an increasing air pollution in cities that are already suffering from high pollution levels. Although Turkey is beginning to take steps to improve air quality, the increased number of automobiles on Turkish streets is hampering this effort.
Of special concern to Turkey is the threat of marine pollution, especially from oil transport through the narrow Bosporus Straits. The 12-mile passage is already one of the most difficult in the world to navigate, and increased shipping--from oil and gas imports flowing into Turkey, as well as increased Russian shipping from the Black Sea through the Straits to world markets--raise the possibility of an accident. Collisions in the Straits have resulted in large oil spills, and additional oil shipping from the Caspian Sea region via the Black Sea and the Bosporus puts the Istanbul area at further environmental risk.
Industrial production has meant that Turkey's carbon emissions are on the rise, and Turkey is not a party to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. Compared to other International Energy Agency countries, Turkey's energy and carbon intensities are low, but per capita energy consumption and per capita carbon emissions are trending upwards.
Turkey has substantial renewable energy resources--especially hydroelectric power--and it is currently constructing a series of dams and hydroelectric power plants. As Turkey looks towards possible European Union membership later in the 21st century, it will need to continue utilizing this cleaner energy as a means to achieve sustainable economic development.
President: Ahmet Necdet Sezer (since May 5, 2000)
Prime Minister: Bulent Ecevit
Independence: October 29, 1923 (successor state to the Ottoman Empire)
Population (1999E): 66.5 million
Location/Size: Southwest Asia/780,580 sq. km (301,930 sq. mi.), slightly larger than Texas
Major Cities: Ankara (capital), Istanbul, Izmir, Adana
Languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Arabic
Ethnic Groups: Turkish (80%), Kurdish (20%)
Religions: Muslim (99.8%, mostly Sunni), other 0.2%
Defense (8/1/98): Army (525,000), Navy (51,000), Air Force (63,000), Coast Guard (2,200), Reserves (378,700)
Currency: Turkish lira (TL)
Market Exchange Rate (8/3/00): US$1=640,260 TL
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (1999E, market exchange rates): $227.4 billion
Real GDP Growth Rate (1999E): -5.3% (2000E): 3.6%-4%
Inflation Rate (1999E): 65% (2000E): 25%-27%
Current Account Balance (2000E): -$5.1 billion
Major Trading Partners: Germany, Italy, United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia
Merchandise Exports (January-May 2000E): $12.7 billion (around half going to the EU)
Merchandise Imports (January-May 2000E): $20.3 billion
Merchandise Trade Balance (January-May 2000E): -$7.8 billion
Major Export Products: Agricultural, textiles, iron, steel
Major Import Products: Oil, machinery, chemicals, iron, steel
Foreign Currency Reserves (non-gold; 7/00): $23.2 billion
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources: Cumhur Ersumer
Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/00): 299 million barrels
Oil Production (1999E): 69,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of which 65,000 bbl/d is crude oil
Oil Consumption (1999E): 624,000 bbl/d
Net Oil Imports (1999E): 555,000 bbl/d
Crude Oil Refining Capacity (1/1/00): 690,915 bbl/d
Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/00E): 314 billion cubic feet (Bcf)
Natural Gas Production (1998E): 20 Bcf
Natural Gas Consumption (1998E): 370 Bcf
Net Natural Gas Imports (1998E): 350 Bcf
Coal Production (1998E): 67.5 million short tons (Mmst)
Coal Consumption (1998E): 78.4 Mmst
Net Coal Imports (1998E): 10.9 Mmst
Estimated Recoverable Coal (1996E): 8.2 billion short tons of lignite
Electric Generation Capacity (2000E): 26 gigawatts (44% hydroelectric, 28% coal/lignite, 18% gas, and 9% fuel oil as of 1998)
Electricity Generation (1998E): 106.7 terawatthours (Twh)
Electricity Consumption (1998E): 102.2 Twh
Minister of Environment: Fevzi Aytekin
Total Energy Consumption (1998E): 2.9 quadrillion Btu* (0.8% of world total energy consumption)
Energy-Related Carbon Emissions (1998E): 47.1 million metric tons of carbon (0.8% of world carbon emissions)
Per Capita Energy Consumption (1998E): 45.6 million Btu (vs. U.S. value of 350.7 million Btu)
Per Capita Carbon Emissions (1998E): 0.7 metric tons of carbon (vs. U.S. value of 5.5 metric tons of carbon)
Energy Intensity (1998E): 13,800 Btu/ $1990 (vs U.S. value of 13,400 Btu/ $1990)**
Carbon Intensity (1998E): 0.23 metric tons of carbon/thousand $1990 (vs U.S. value of 0.21 metric tons/thousand $1990)**
Sectoral Share of Energy Consumption (1997E): Industrial (50.0%), Residential (27.0%), Transportation (16.4%), Commercial (6.7%)
Sectoral Share of Carbon Emissions (1997E): Industrial (53.4%), Transportation (20.8%), Residential (20.2%), Commercial (5.6%)
Fuel Share of Energy Consumption (1998E): Oil (43.9%), Coal (26.7%), Natural Gas (13.2%)
Fuel Share of Carbon Emissions (1998E): Oil (46.5%), Coal (41.8%), Natural Gas (11.6%)
Renewable Energy Consumption (1997E): 719 trillion Btu* (1% decrease from 1996)
Number of People per Motor Vehicle (1997): 13.7 (vs. U.S. value of 1.3)
Status in Climate Change Negotiations: Turkey is not a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or to the Kyoto Protocol.
Major Environmental Issues: Water pollution from dumping of chemicals and detergents; air pollution, particularly in urban areas; deforestation; concern for oil spills from increasing Bosporus ship traffic
Major International Environmental Agreements: A party to Conventions on Air Pollution, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Desertification, Hazardous Wastes, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands and Whaling. Has signed, but not ratified, Antarctic-Environmental Protocol and Environmental Modification
* The total energy consumption statistic includes petroleum, dry natural gas,
coal, net hydro, nuclear, geothermal, solar and wind electric power. The renewable
energy consumption statistic is based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data
and includes hydropower, solar, wind, tide, geothermal, solid biomass and animal
products, biomass gas and liquids, industrial and municipal wastes. Sectoral
shares of energy consumption and carbon emissions are also based on IEA data.
**GDP based on EIA International Energy Annual 1998
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES
State Oil Company: Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO)
State Refining Company: Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (Tupras)
State Pipelines and Gas Agency: Botas
State Oil Products Retailer: Petrol Ofisi AS (POAS)
Major Ports: Iskenderun, Istanbul, Mersin, Izmir
Major Oil and Gas Fields: Bati Raman, Karakus, K. Karakus
Major Pipelines: Turkey-Iraq ; Turkey contains 1,078 miles of crude oil pipelines, 1,439 miles of oil product pipelines, and 439 miles of natural gas pipelines
Major Refineries (crude oil capacity): Izmit (226,440 bbl/d), Aliaga-Izmir (226,440 bbl/d), Kirikkale (113,200 bbl/d), Mersin (100,000 bbl/d), Batman-Siirt (22,015 bbl/d)
Sources for this report include: Agence France Presse; Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections; Asian Wall Street Journal; Associated Press Newswires; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; Cambridge Energy Research Associates; CIA World Factbook 1999; CSIS Caspian Energy Update; Dow Jones Newswires; Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire; Energy Report; Financial Times; Hart's European Petroleum Finance Week; Hart's Oil and Gas Investor; International Water Power and Dam Construction; Middle East Economic Digest; National Post (Canada); New York Times; Oil Daily; Oil and Gas Journal; Petroleum Economist; Petroleum Intelligence Weekly; Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School; Reuters; PR Newswire; U.S. Energy Information Administration; Wall Street Journal; Washington Post.